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Abstract
This article explores the working conditions of  Icelandic local councillors in 
relation to voluntary retirement from the council. In the past three elections, 
the turnover in councils has been very high, with approximately six out of  
every 10 council members being new recruits at the beginning of  each term. 
The turnover has also highlighted possible gender issues, as more women than 
men (proportionally) leave the council after their first term. The findings reveal 
a significant difference between the councillors who plan to stay and those 
who opt to leave. This is in relation to the local authorities’ population size, 
satisfaction with remuneration, and seniority in the council. Thus, councillors 
in larger municipalities or councillors satisfied with their remuneration are more 
likely to run for council versus councillors from smaller municipalities and those 
less happy with their remuneration. Seniority is also a decisive factor, as the 
majority of  all councillors leave after the first term. Significant differences were 
not found between the female and male councillors in relation to voluntary 
retirement. However, gendered differences were found in relation to institutional 
position and working conditions, suggesting a gender-based division of  labour 
in local councils.
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Dutiful citizen or a 
pragmatic professional? 
Introduction
Local authorities have experienced turbulent times during the past several decades. The 
number of  municipalities has dropped 64 percent from 204 in 1990 to 74 in 2017. Con-
sequently, the number of  elected members in local councils is now 504, compared to 
1116 in 1990 (Statistics Iceland 2017a). During the same period, the responsibilities for 
local governments have grown substantially as they are now for example responsible for 
primary education and disability services. In 2014, fulfilment of  these responsibilities 
required a commitment of  approximately 30 percent of  the total public expenditure, up 
from 20 percent in the 1990s (Kristinsson 2014). Traditionally, Icelandic local govern-
ments have enjoyed high levels of  trust, with around 60 percent expressing high confi-
dence in local government in 2009 (Kristinsson 2014). The recent financial turbulence 
does not seem to have shaken the public’s trust. 
However, there are some worrying trends at the local level. Traditionally, there is a 
high turnout for elections at the local level. This trend has been disrupted, as the past 
three elections displayed notable decline in voter participation. The turnout went below 
80 percent to 78.7 percent in 2006. It again dropped to 73.4 percent in 2010 and 66.5 
percent in 2014. The turnout in the city of  Reykjavík dropped below 60 percent. At 
the same time, the number of  new members in the local council has risen dramatically. 
In the past three elections, around six of  every ten members of  local councils are new 
recruits (Statistics Iceland 2010; 2015). 
Furthermore, problems have been reported regarding the recruitment of  candidates 
willing to run for council (Samband íslenskra sveitarfélaga 2013). The impact of  re-
cruitment on political careers is a well-known field of  research (MacKenzie & Kousser 
2014; Schlesinger 1966), especially within legislative studies. Although research on local 
councillor recruitment is less developed, there is still some notable work available on the 
subject (Verhelst, Reynaert, & Steyvers 2013). The voluntary retirement of  local council-
lors has received even less attention (Aars & Offerdal 1998; Hjelmar, Olsen, & Pedersen 
2010), although this affects how we view the development of  political careers.
Local councillors in Iceland receive their mandate through local elections, and as is the 
case with national politics, some candidates get elected and some do not. Local politics 
have proven to be somewhat less turbulent than politics on the national level. Neverthe-
less, in the past 15 years the number of  voluntary retirements from local councils (indi-
viduals who do not seek re-election) has risen dramatically. It is foreseeable that at least 
40 percent of  councillors will not be seeking re-election in the May 2018 local elections. 
The aim of  this paper is twofold. The first objective is to explore the differences 
between councillors who express the willingness to run for re-election and those who 
choose not to run. The second objective is to discuss why the high level of  voluntary 
retirements at the local level may not be good for local governance. 
The article begins with an overview of  the theoretical background and an introduc-
tion of  the hypothesis. The second section discusses the Icelandic political system. The 
third section introduces the data collection, and the results are explained in the fourth 
section. The paper then closes with a discussion.
171Eva Marín Hlynsdóttir STJÓRNMÁL
&
STJÓRNSÝSLA
1. Theoretical framework: From laymen to professional
Mouritzen and Svara (2002) argue that all local governments present some middle 
ground between the principles of  the ‘layman rule’, ‘political leadership’, and ‘profes-
sionalism’. When applying these principles to the recruitment process of  local council-
lors, two ideal types of  recruitment and career development emerge. One type is based 
on the layman or amateur politician, Steyvers and Verhelst (2012) claim that this type is 
ideal and is based on the idea of  political equality. Essentially, this means that any citizen 
who meets required criteria like age or citizenship is eligible for political office. There-
fore, the recruitment process is open, and movement in and out of  the political sphere 
is relatively simple. Ideally, the council proportionally reflects society. In this case, the 
emphasis is on the representative role of  the councillor (Beetham 1996). 
On the other hand, Steyvers and Verhelst (2012) point to the notion of  politics as a 
profession (Borraz & John 2004; Guérin & Kerrouche 2008), where chances for recruit-
ment and career development are no longer equally distributed. Thus, there is an over-
representation of  the brokerage professions, such as lawyers or teachers (Norris 1997; 
Reynaert 2012) in systems based on the professional principle. In this instance expertise 
matters more than mirroring society, therefore, the importance of  responsiveness ex-
ceeds representativeness (Beetham 1996). 
If  we further explore these ideal types, we see that professional politicians are viewed 
as ambitious individuals who are constantly searching for a way to enhance their politi-
cal careers (MacKenzie & Kousser 2014; Schlesinger 1966). However, laymen individu-
als develop different attitudes since their participation in council work is regarded as 
a leisure-time activity (Steyvers & Verhelst 2012), and they do not necessarily see re-
election as a goal in and of  itself. This contrasts with professional politicians, who try to 
establish continuity in their careers (Aars & Offerdal 1998). The debate between laymen 
and professional politicians also touches on the overall relationship between politics and 
administration. This relationship explores whether politics and administration should be 
regarded as separate spheres or overlapping (Demir 2009; Frederickson & Smith 2003).
Overall, the foundation of  local government systems has changed in the past 25 
years. Although decentralisation and increased autonomy at the local level has strength-
ened the control of  local councils, the decision-making processes have simultaneously 
become more complex (Guérin & Kerrouche 2008). These changes have increased the 
demand for a higher level of  expertise in local councillors, as well as the demand for a 
greater distribution of  power between different types of  councillors. Guérin and Ker-
rouche (2008, 179-180) argue that this has increased the gap between regular councillors 
(backbenchers) and those assigned to leadership positions, this puts a question mark 
behind the role of  council members in the public domain (Lepine & Sullivan 2010). 
The Icelandic council-committee system is principally a layman system, as all coun-
cillors except members of  the Reykjavík city council are paid part-time for their involve-
ment. Though local authorities are legally obligated to provide remuneration for local 
councillors, there are no coordinated pay scales or salary benchmarks like those often 
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and/or pay scales combined with increased councillor turnover prompted the Icelandic 
Local Government Association to suggest that an increase in remuneration would be 
one method of  solving the problem of  high councillor turnover. In relation to that, the 
Association published a guideline on compensation standards for local authorities (Sam-
band íslenskra sveitarfélaga 2016). Research has shown that the return rate of  council-
lors with a main source of  income apart from remuneration is lower than the return rate 
for local councillors who are employed full time (Verhelst et al. 2013). 
Nevertheless, there is a complex relationship between the motivation to serve pub-
licly and intrinsic rewards, like the sense of  accomplishment on the one hand and ex-
trinsic reward, like financial remuneration on the other (Mann 2006). In relation to that, 
Pedersen (2014) argues that it is wise to view the motivation of  councillors as being in-
fluenced by both intrinsic and extrinsic rewards. She also claims that such factors can be 
fairly ‘self-interested’ (p. 896). Findings from a study on Danish councillors—who also 
receive low remuneration for their council work—showed that they are also motivated 
by their institutional positions, and that holding these positions made them less likely to 
retire voluntarily (Hjelmar et al. 2010, 414). Other findings have shown that being as-
signed a committee or leadership position is an important factor when it comes to the 
possibility of  re-election (Baekgaard 2014; Martin 2014). 
Although there is limited research on Icelandic councils, including the career out-
looks of  councillors and their working conditions, there are clear indicators of  substan-
tial differences between majority and minority factions within the councils regarding 
responsibilities and workloads (Hlynsdóttir 2016a). In line with these findings, I expect 
position within the council, institutional position and seniority to be important. 
H1: I expect members of  the council minority to be less willing to run for re-election. 
H2: I expect that holding a higher institutional position makes retirement less likely. 
H3: I expect that seniority makes councillors less likely to run for re-election.
In their seminal work, Size and Democracy, Dahl and Tufte (1973) argued for a two-dimen-
sional measurement of  citizen effectiveness and system capacity. The former refers to 
the extent citizens can control decisions of  the polity, and system capacity refers to the 
polity’s capacity to respond effectively to its citizens. This debate is particularly relevant 
to research on local-level Icelandic governments, because size is a predominant theme 
in all local government research. In the Icelandic context, there is a great size differ-
ence between the smallest municipalities (around 50 residents) and the largest (around 
120,000 residents). 
From a legal perspective, the very small municipalities with few hundred residents 
are still supposed to deliver the same service to their citizens as is done in the capital 
city of  Reykjavík. However, there is an enormous difference in capacity between these 
two types of  municipalities. In most cases, smaller municipalities rely on simple admin-
istrative structures and only a handful of  individuals to provide administrative services 
(Hlynsdóttir 2016b). Furthermore, research has shown that the population size in mu-
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nicipalities is an important factor in explaining differences in party presence (Kristins-
son 2010), leadership (Hlynsdóttir 2016a), and the overall working conditions of  local 
government authorities (Kristinsson 2001; 2014). 
The number of  very large municipalities is also much lower in Iceland than in neigh-
bouring countries. What is considered large in Iceland is small in most other countries. 
For example, all municipalities in Denmark with less than 20,000 residents are consid-
ered ‘small’ (Christoffersen & Klausen 2012). Conversely, municipalities in Iceland with 
more than 10,000 residents are thought to be big, and municipalities with more than 
20,000 residents are simply ‘huge’. Randma-Liiv (2002) has argued that public organisa-
tions in small states have more challenges in managing their public service provisions 
compared to those in larger states. Following this argument, the small overall nature of  
the Icelandic system enhances the problem of  size, as the overall capacity of  the sys-
tem to provide support for local councillors, local administration and local leadership is 
diminished. This is supported by findings suggesting that increased decentralisation in 
recent decades has enlarged the workload for both local administrations and councils 
(Hlynsdóttir 2016a). 
As almost all councillors in Iceland are laymen, an increase in workload affects them 
differently than it would if  they were professionals. 
H4: I expect councillors with high workloads to be less willing to run for re-election. 
H5: I expect council members in smaller municipalities to be less willing to run for re-election. 
The importance of  the ‘politics of  presence’ has long been established (Phillips 1995), 
as most research based on this approach is concentrated on the traditional question of  
‘where are the women’ as opposed to ‘which women’ (Beckwith 2005). This is also related 
to the discussion on the presence of  women as a ‘critical mass’ instead of  as ‘critical ac-
tors’ (Childs & Krook 2009). One interesting result of  the Icelandic 2008 financial crisis 
was the development of  a seemingly female-friendly atmosphere (Loftsdóttir & Björns-
dóttir 2010), this was demonstrated in the 2010 elections which resulted in a record num-
ber of  female councillors. During this election, 39.8 percent of  councillors were women, 
compared to 35.9 percent in 2006. This trend continued in the 2014 local elections, with a 
staggering 44 percent of  the councillors being female. The number of  female councillors 
at the local level is considerably higher than the UN benchmark of  30 percent (Alibego-
vic, Slijepcevic, & Šipic 2013, 184), and in at least 20 percent of  cases during the 2010-
2014 term, the majority of  councillors in individual councils were female. 
It is a general belief  that it is easier for women and minorities to be elected to coun-
cils in larger municipalities. Consequently, people in smaller municipalities have long 
been suspected of  being more reserved in the number of  women they elect to councillor 
positions (Einarsdóttir & Hjartardóttir 2009; Kristjánsson & Styrkársdóttir 2001; Sig-
urjónsdóttir & Indriðason 2008). Thus, as the number of  councils has plummeted, the 
number of  councils with very low proportion of  women or no women councillors at all 
has decreased. At the same time, the proportion of  female councillors has risen from 21 
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Overall, empirical results show that women are underrepresented in leadership posi-
tions (Carli & Eagly 2011; Einarsdóttir & Hjartardóttir 2009; Johansson 2006), whether 
or not these posts are political or administrative in nature. For example, Duerst-Lahti 
(2010, 22) points out that the more powerful a position is expected to be, the less likely 
it is that a woman occupies it. It is simply much harder for women to enter into and 
hold leadership positions. One aspect of  this problem is the concept of  time and the 
expectation of  total availability, as leaders are expected to be available full time (and all 
the time). As such, research findings indicate that leadership positions rely heavily on 
some kind of  private support system from home. This is especially damaging for women 
(Lyon & Woodward 2004) because they are more often responsible for the organisation 
of  household chores. 
H6: I expect women to be less willing than men to run for re-election. 
2. The Icelandic local political system
The legal structure of  the Icelandic local municipal system draws heavily from Danish 
tradition, as the foundation of  the system at that time (established in 1872) was based on 
the Danish local government system (Valsson 2014). The Icelandic system is a monistic 
(Wollmann 2004) system, with the council legally being the most powerful entity. Local 
elections take place every four years (the next elections will take place in 2018) and are 
proportional (D’Hondt), but unlike the national elections, there is no legal threshold. 
The small size of  the councils serves as a de facto threshold, as it is relatively difficult for 
new parties or lists to enter these councils. Each council has the authority to change the 
number of  council members according to municipality size, and the change goes into 
effect during the next election cycle. On average, the population size represented by 
Icelandic local councils is 4,533, but it drops to 2,912 when the capital city of  Reykjavík 
is excluded (Statistics Iceland 2017a).
According to Article 11 of  the Local Government Act no. 138/2011, the number 
of  councillors should be between five and seven for municipalities with less than 2,000 
residents, seven to 11 for municipalities with 2,000–9,999 residents, 11 to 15 for mu-
nicipalities with 10,000–49,999 residents, 15 to 23 for municipalities with 50,000–99,999 
residents and 23 to 31 for municipalities with over 100,000 residents.1 In reality, more 
than two-thirds of  all councils consist of  between five and seven-members. Icelandic 
councils are rather small in comparison to those in other Nordic countries. For example, 
the council size in rural municipalities in Norway consists of  15 to 20 members (Bjørnå 
2012). 
The proportional election process combined with a small number of  seats make it 
difficult for new parties to enter the councils. It has also been argued that councils are 
reluctant to raise the number of  council members (Kristinsson 2014), and they often use 
the lower end of  the council member allowance limit. For example, some councils only 
have nine-members when they could have 15 members. However, it is often regarded 
as controversial if  councils choose to increase the number of  members, as evidenced 
175Eva Marín Hlynsdóttir STJÓRNMÁL
&
STJÓRNSÝSLA
in the recent news coverage of  the proposed increase in number of  councillors in the 
Reykjavík city council (RUV 2017). 
When running for a council seat in the Icelandic local government elections, each 
party needs to set up a list of  candidates that matches the number of  council members 
in the municipality. Therefore, the party needs a list of  five members for the council 
seats along with five substitutes (a total of  ten candidates) for a five-member council. 
Individuals are not able to run for council seats, except in municipalities not able to use 
the proportional election method. 
Less-populated municipalities often experience situations where no lists emerge be-
fore an election, therefore the proportional method cannot be used. When this occurs, 
elections are fully open, and each eligible citizen over 18 years of  age (including foreign-
ers) is a possible candidate for the council seat. Electors write the name of  the candi-
date of  their choosing on the ballot sheet, and the five people who receive the largest 
number of  votes are legally obligated to accept a seat on the local council for the next 
four years. The individual receiving the highest number of  votes usually becomes the 
leader of  the council, and he or she is often the de facto manager of  the municipality. 
This type of  ‘personal vote’ is not very common anymore and in 2014, this was the case 
for 18 municipalities. In addition only one list came forward in three municipalities and 
its members became automatically council members, i.e. no ballot took place (Statistics 
Iceland 2015).
The election system is a multi-party system. However, political parties are not very 
strong at the local level, and local politics have a strong local presence. It may not come 
as a surprise that there is a strong positive correlation between the population sizes of  
municipalities and the emergence of  political parties, since smaller communities often 
find it challenging to organise political work (Kristinsson 2010). Conversely, urbanisa-
tion seems to play a part in this development because voting records throughout the 
twentieth-century show that smaller villages and towns were much more likely to organ-
ise political work based on national parties versus their counterparts in even much larger 
rural communities. 
In the 2014 elections, a considerable proportion of  elected representatives came 
from local lists. Out of  184 lists, 104 were party lists affiliated with national parties and 
80 were local or issue-based lists (Statistics Iceland 2015). Findings from the Kristins-
son study (2001) on local government show that in municipalities with more than 2000 
inhabitants, most lists were affiliated with national parties. With 120 members in local 
councils, the Independence Party is, by far, the best-represented party at the local level. 
This is followed by the Progressive Party, with 56 members. Therefore, tendency for 
people to organise local lists for local elections has a long tradition.
The presence of  women has been growing as mentioned earlier. Forty-four percent 
of  elected council members in 2014 were female, compared to 39.8 percent in 2010 and 
35.9 percent in 2006. However, allocations for the top spot on candidate lists for Icelan-
dic local elections are still male-dominated, as 67 percent of  individuals recommended 
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Sweden 2013). Conversely, 58 percent of  the individuals recommended for the second 
seat on the lists are women. Women are also more often in the third seat on a candidate 
list, while numbers for the fourth and fifth seat show an equal gender distribution (Sta-
tistics Iceland 2010; 2015). 
Furthermore, 58 percent of  council members elected in 2014 were new recruits. Of  
the council members that were elected in 2010 and who returned to the council four 
years later, 46 percent were male and 37 percent were female. These numbers are similar 
to what was revealed in the 2010 elections (Statistics Iceland 2010; 2015).
As mentioned earlier, the main decision-making body is the council, and it appoints 
committees that are each functionally responsible for a defined area. The committees 
mirror the relative political strength of  different parties or lists; however, committee 
members do not need to be council members. It is likely that committees that closely 
match party affiliations are more common in larger municipalities, but members are 
also often chosen because of  alleged expertise. Suspicion of  gender biases in relation 
to committees has risen, as more men are supposedly appointed to technical commit-
tees, while more women are appointed to social service and educational committees 
(Jóhannsdóttir 2010). 
The executive committee/board has a special status, as it is only found in munici-
palities with councils consisting of  seven or more members. Membership on this com-
mittee/board directly reflects the majority/minority combination in the council, and its 
members are always elected council members. For example, when the board consists 
of  three individuals, two represent the majority in the council and one represents the 
minority, regardless of  how many total parties are represented in the council. Thus, not 
all parties have a representative on the executive board. In recent years, the executive 
committee has been gaining political importance at the council’s expense (Hlynsdóttir 
2016a), and it has become more common for individuals to invest more political leader-
ship in the role of  executive board leader versus the role of  council leader. 
Similar to the national level, coalitions have been a central part of  Icelandic local 
government. This is especially true in larger councils. However, due to the number of  
very small councils (five members), the most common type of  council majority during 
the 2010-2014 term was a one-party majority. During that term, 46 percent of  all coun-
cils were run by a one-party majority. It was also normal for only two lists to be present 
in less-populated municipalities. Other councils had two, three or even four party ma-
jorities. As is the case for the national government, minority leadership is exceedingly 
rare. Consequently, the high number of  councils with only five or seven seats produces a 
clear majority system, as most councils (around 65 percent) have either one or two-party 
majorities. The role of  political leadership is invested in the council leader, executive 
board leader or an executive mayor (see Hlynsdóttir 2016b for further discussion), but 
these political leaders do not have any decision-making powers apart from the council 
with the exception of  the executive mayor. Nevertheless, norms and practices give them 
great power (Hlynsdóttir 2016a). 
Compared to other countries, Icelandic local authorities enjoy a high level of  au-
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tonomy (Ladner, Keuffer, & Baldersheim 2015), as their right to local self-governance is 
clearly stated in Article 78 of  the Icelandic constitution. Similar to the local authorities in 
other Nordic countries (and unlike English local authorities), Icelandic local authorities 
are able to take on any task they choose as long as it is not legally assigned to any other 
body. However, Icelandic local authorities do not have the power to levy taxes. Until 
recently, local authorities also played only a limited role in the provision of  the welfare 
service, which contributed to a tradition of  entrepreneurship (Kristinsson 2015) within 
local councils. 
Different from their Nordic counterparts, Icelandic local council members are 
unusually active in the development and implementation of  tasks (Hlynsdóttir 2016a; 
Kristinsson 2014). In the neighbouring countries, the councils often function as assem-
blies. In contrast, the Icelandic local councils are relatively small, so they have a much 
more functional and active role in the day-to-day management of  the municipality. Most 
mid-sized local authorities rely on just 10 to 15 people within their core administration 
(Hlynsdóttir 2016a), and many municipalities with less than 1,000 residents have an even 
smaller number of  people working within their core administration. As a result, the 
level of  professional skills is relatively low within the administration, and local authori-
ties rely heavily on external actors like private law firms, the main office of  the Local 
Government Association, or staffs within other inter-municipal cooperation schemes. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to assert that council members are an important extension of  
the local administration. 
With the exception of  the Reykjavík city council, which employs its city council 
members full-time, other council members are paid part-time for their services. Council 
leaders or executive leaders are often full-time, while other council members are paid 
by the hour or per meeting. Article 32 in Local Government Act, no. 138/2011 states 
that council members should be compensated. However, it does not specify the manner 
of  how members are to be compensated. The below survey reveals a complex system 
of  monthly payments; some are paid by the hour, some are paid by meetings and some 
payments are attached to the Parliamentarian salaries. There was no clear pattern. Kris-
tinsson (2014) has pointed out that councillors with a low level of  compensation are 
less satisfied with their work conditions than those with higher levels of  compensation. 
3. Data
Data were collected from April 2017 to June 2017. The questionnaire was based on 
a survey originally used in the Municipal Assemblies in European Local Government 
(MAELG) project (Egner, Sweeting, & Klok 2013). The survey was sent via email to all 
councillors (504) who were active during the data collection period. The response con-
sisted of  300 councillors (59.9 percent), with 54 percent of  the respondents being male 
and 46 percent being female. The sample was representative of  the population, with 64 
percent of  all female councillors and 57 percent of  all male councillors responding to 
the survey. 
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election. This was measured by the question: ‘Now the end of  this term is approaching. 
Would you like to run for council again?’ Responses were: ‘Yes, I would like to continue 
as councillor’ (29.9 percent), ‘No, I plan to quit as councillor’ (43.45 percent) and ‘Unde-
cided’ (29.9 percent). Responses rated as ‘undecided’ were left out of  the final analysis. 
Indications of  the councillors’ willingness to run for re-election were explored through 
the following questions: 
• How much time per month do you spend on the following activi-
ties? (Council and committee meetings, meeting with party, desk 
work preparation preparing your activity in the council, meetings 
with citizens and other important activity as councillor). 
• Do you presently hold any of  the following elective or executive 
offices? (Council leader/leader of  executive committee/ execu-
tive mayor/ minority leader/leader of  a committee). 
• For how many years have you been a councillor in total? This 
variable as also used as an interval variable, grouped into five 
groups of  council terms from one council term to five or more. 
• Considering your responsibilities, do you think your allowance 
as councillor is adequate or not? (1-7) 1= Not adequate; 7= Ad-
equate.
• Is your party in majority or minority in the council? (majority, 
minority, personal vote). 
• How much time do you spend on the following activities per 
week? (Paid employment; unpaid care and household work). 
Other variables that were adjusted were the population size of  councillors’ municipali-
ties2 and the age and gender of  the respondents. As seen in Table 1 proportion of  re-
sponses between different population groups were relatively similar. Furthermore, the 
response rate within each group was representative of  the population with around 60 
percent, which is similar to the overall response rate. The mean age of  the respondents 
was 49.4 years.
Table 1. Population size, proportion, and councillors mean age
Population % Mean age SD
<200 8.7 54.1 10.4
200-499 15.0 48.7 9.7
500-999 18.0 48.5 9.5
1000-1999 17.7 47.6 7.6
2000-4999 18.7 49.3 8.2
5000-9999 7.0 50.5 7.6
10000> 15.0 50.6 8.1
Total 100 49.4 8.8




Holding an institutional position has been shown to be a decisive factor for councillors 
when it comes to choosing whether to stay or leave the council (Hjelmar et al. 2010). 
Seniority (measured by the number of  years in the council or in number of  terms) is also 
an important factor, because people generally tend to move higher up the institutional 
ladder the longer they stay in the council. Previous research findings indicate that an im-
portant indicator for holding a higher institutional position is being a majority member 
in the council (H1) (Hlynsdóttir 2016a).















Continue  Quit Undecided 
 
Majority Minority Personal vote 
Although members of  the minority are generally believed to be less influential in the 
context of  Icelandic councils, there is no statistically significant difference between 
members of  the majority or minority when it comes to deciding if  they would like to 
run for council again. Interestingly, council members elected through ‘personal votes’ 
have a much lower percentage of  undecided responses (9 percent) (Fig 1). The practice 
of  personal voting is mostly used in very small municipalities that have a small pool 
of  possible candidates. This correlation also exists when considering the average time 
spent as a council member. The average time of  service in the council is 6.48 years for 
members of  the majority and 6.36 years for minority members. However, councillors 
voted in through personal votes have spent an average of  8.45 years as council members. 
Danish findings demonstrate that council members with high seniority are more 
likely to quit than the more junior members of  the councils. This is partly age-related 
and partly related to the reality that the possibility of  advancement to higher positions 
of  power or prestige is limited at the local level. Thus, those who have reached the limit 
of  advancement tend to leave (Hjelmar et al. 2010). Therefore, seniority is expected to 
have a negative influence on councillors’ willingness to stay in the council (H2). 
The results show that there is a statistically significant difference (t (208), = 3.07 P < 
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However, unlike the Danish findings, seniority makes councillors more willing to stay on 
as council members. Those who are willing to run for council again have already been 
councillors for an average of  7.62 years (SD = 6.98). Those who are not willing to run 
again have served an average of  5.23 years in the council (SD = 4.26). 












1 term  2 terms  3 terms  4 terms  5 terms 
The proportion of  council members in relation to the number of  terms served, showed 
that around half  of  all council members in the survey are in their first term (49.7 percent). 
Seventy-six percent of  the respondents are in their first two terms. Overall, Icelandic 
councillors tend to be slightly younger than their average European counterparts. The 
mean age of  Icelandic local councillors in 2014 was 45.8 years (Statistics Iceland 2015), 
compared to 51.1 years in the MAELG study (Reynaert 2012). More than 40 percent of  
the respondents in this survey belonged to the 40 to 49 age group. In contrast, the Danish 
findings showed that only 18 percent of  councillors were in this age group, and 40 per-
cent of  the respondents were councillors 60 years of  age or older (Hjelmar et al. 2010). 
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Figure 3. Trend in gender proportions and number of election terms
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A comparison of  female and male council members shows that there is a statisti-
cally significant difference in the number of  years served in the council. On average, as 
female councillors (M = 5.6, SD = 4.6) serve for a much shorter period than male coun-
cillors (M = 7.5, SD = 6.4) (t (297) = 3.037(<0.003)). When adjusting for the number 
of  terms served, no significant difference was found. However, there is a notable and 
proportional difference in the willingness of  male and female councillors to continue as 
council members (Fig 3). Of  the women who decided to continue as council members, 
two-thirds are in their first term, while only 12.5 percent of  women in their second term 
decided to continue as council members. When compared to their female counterparts, 
56.5 percent of  male councillors in their first term decided to continue as council mem-
bers, 23.9 percent of  male councillors who decided to continue are in their second term. 
A similar trend arises when looking at those who decided not to run for council 
again. Of  the female councillors who decided to leave, 46.9 percent are in their first 
term and 35.9 percent are in their second term. Of  the males who decided to leave, 37.7 
percent are in their first term and 26.2 percent are in their second term. For all female 
councillors who decided to leave, 82.8 percent are in their first two terms. For all male 
councillors who decided to leave, 63.9 percent are in their first two terms. Both female 
and male council members are more likely to leave after their first term in the council. 
However, a much higher proportion of  women leave after the first and the second term 
compared to their male counterparts. 
Research findings suggest that institutional position plays an important role when it 
comes voluntary retirement. Therefore, it was hypothesized that holding an institutional 
position was related to councillors’ willingness to run for council again (H2). Results 
showed that holding a higher institutional position was not significantly related to the 
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councillors’ decision to not run for council again. This is interesting, as an institutional 
position is usually seen as motivation for councillors to remain (Hjelmar et al. 2010). 
The findings from the survey further reveal that 60 percent of  all respondents are lead-
ing some kind of  committee. Consequently, the possibilities for councillors to take on re-
sponsibilities through committee leadership are considerable. However, notable findings 
were exposed when looking closer at institutional positions in relation to gender (see Fig 4). 
When exploring higher institutional positions in comparison to lower level institu-
tional positions the findings reveal a significant gender difference. This suggests a ten-
dency towards gender-based division of  labour within local councils (Fox & Schuhmann 
1999; Kreimer 2004). There, seems to be an abundance of  possibilities for council mem-
bers to take on responsibilities through leadership of  a committee, albeit gendered pos-
sibilities. The number of  individuals holding such posts also suggests a large workload 
on council members. These council members are usually referred to as ‘backbenchers’.
Workload is an important factor when looking at council work. Usually, this is also a 
defining difference between a system based on the laymen principle and a system based 
on council work as a profession (Mouritzen & Svara 2002). Another issue is remunera-
tion, as there has been an ongoing debate in Iceland regarding how much local council-
lors should be compensated for their council work (Helgason 2017). In relation to this, I 
hypothesized that councillors with a larger workload were less willing to run for council 
again (H4). I also hypothesized that population size is negatively related to councillors’ 
willingness to run again (H5). This suggests that councillors in small municipalities are 
more likely to plan a voluntarily retirement than councillors in larger municipalities. 
Findings from the MAELG survey show that there is a great variation between 
countries regarding the hours spent on council work (Aars, Offerdal, & Rysavy 2012). 
The mean hours spent on council work each month range from 13.1 in Croatia to 57.1 
in Spain. Of  the Nordic countries represented in the study, Swedish councillors spent 
on average of  17.8 hours each month on council work and Norwegian councillors spent 
an average of  18.8 hours each month on council work. Conversely, a Danish study 
showed that Danish councillors worked 19 to 20 hours each week on council-related 
work (Dahlgaard, Hjelmar, Olsen, & Pedersen 2009). This suggests that Danish coun-
cillors spend a staggering 76 to 80 hours each month on council work. As a matter or 
note, the Danish system relies on the laymen system, and the local councillors receive 
only limited remuneration for their work. In an Icelandic study on local councillors in 
municipalities with 2,000 residents or more, findings showed that councillors in larger 
municipalities worked more on council-related work than councillors in smaller munici-
palities (Kristinsson 2014).
Findings from the study show that the average Icelandic councillor spends 40.9 
hours a month on council-related work. This is obviously much higher than most other 
European countries, including our Nordic neighbours, with the exception of  Denmark. 
As is evident in Table 2, there is a considerable difference in the workload between dif-
ferent size groups. Council members in municipalities with less than 500 residents work 
the lowest number of  hours each month. 
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In relation to the workload and the willingness of  council members to continue in 
the council, those who were willing to run again worked more hours on average (M = 
45.8, SD = 44.6) than those who were not willing to run for council again (M = 35.2, 
SD = 27.9). The mean difference (t (197) = -2.25, P < 0.) is statistically significant. Thus, 
the workload is positively correlated with the councillors’ willingness to run for council 
again, not negatively, as was expected (H4). However, care must be taken when inter-
preting these findings, as they do not necessarily suggest that increasing the councillors’ 
workload will lower the rate of  voluntary retirements. Overall, local councillors spend a 
considerable time of  their ‘leisure’ time doing council work. Previous research findings 
showed considerably more time being spent on council work (Kristinsson 2014) than 
the findings from this survey. 
Another important factor when it comes to interpreting workload is the size of  the 
local authority. The survey results support the importance of  size in relation to council 
members’ willingness to continue as council members. Therefore, those willing to run 
for council again are more likely to come from more populated municipalities (M = 4.53, 
SD = 2) than less populated municipalities (M = 3.64, SD = 1.75) (t (209) = -3.44, P < 
0.001). 
In relation to this, the council members’ satisfaction with remuneration was also 
explored. A similar trend was noticed in relation to the population size and satisfaction 
with remuneration groups. Apart from a very small population group of  less than 200 
residents, satisfaction with remuneration gradually rose with population size. This trend 
was further strengthened when satisfaction with payments was compared to willingness 
to run for council again. Satisfaction with payments for council work was higher (on 
average) among those who intended to run again for council (M = 4.26, SD = 1.62) than 
among those who intended to leave (M = 3.26, SD =1.71). The mean difference (t (209) 
= - 3.38, P < 0.01) is statistically significant. These findings support the hypothesis that 
councillors from smaller municipalities are more likely to opt for voluntary retirement 
than councillors from larger municipalities (H5). 
Studies on local government have shown that there is a considerably higher turnover 
Table 2. Population size and hours spent by councillors on council work
Hours spent on council work each month
Population size Mean N SD
<200 22.7 24 25.6
200-499 25.9 43 18.2
500-999 34.7 47 41.3
1000-1999 31.8 49 34.8
2000-4999 41.5 51 38.2
5000-9999 41.1 21 14.4
10000> 81.6 44 49.1
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of  councillors in systems based on the laymen principle (Steyvers & Verhelst 2012). 
In addition, small municipalities (anything below 10,000 residents) have a lower level 
of  administrative capacity, both in manpower and professional capacity (Hlynsdóttir 
2016a). Thus, council members in large municipalities have better administrative sup-
port systems and are more often partly or fully compensated for their council work. This 
decreases the likelihood of  voluntary retirement. 
The final issue is gender. At the beginning of  this discussion, a hypothesis was put 
forward regarding women being less willing than men to run for council again. Although 
proportionally more women than men plan to leave the council, no statistically signifi-
cant difference between female and male councillors in relation to voluntary retirement 
was found. 
However, when looking at the working conditions of  both genders, notable differ-
ences become known (see Table 3). 
Table 3. Gendered differences in hours worked in the council and for paid and 
unpaid work
 Female Male
M SD M SD t-test Df
Hours worked in council (month) 37.3 33.6 44 44.5 1.42 277
Hours worked in payed profession (week) 42 11.8 46,7 13.1 -2.88** 233
Hours worked for unpaid work (week) 24.8 11.1 16.9 13.1 -3.25** 165
P < .001
As shown in Table 3 there is no statistically significant difference between genders re-
garding the number of  hours spent on council work. However, a whole new pattern is 
revealed when it comes to work outside the council. The average work-week for females 
is shorter than the average work-week for males. However, women spend more time 
each week on unpaid work than their male counterparts. This supports other findings 
that claim women are more often responsible for unpaid housework (Lyon & Wood-
ward 2004), making time an important variable when it comes to the working condi-
tions for female councillors. This is further confirmed by the fact that the 44.4 percent 
of  female councillors who opted for voluntary retirement agreed with the statement ‘I 
think political work is too time-consuming in relation to family or occupation’. Only 
29.5 percent of  males agreed with this statement. 
5. Conclusions
This paper set out to explore the differences between Icelandic councillors who are 
planning voluntary retirement from the council and those who are not. The findings 
reveal a trend of  high workloads, high voluntary turnover, and gendered differences in 
working conditions within the council. The findings also reveal statistically significant 
differences between councillors’ work conditions based on the population size of  the 
local authority. 
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What difference does it make if  there is a high level of  voluntary retirement in coun-
cils? One might suggest that it is a sign of  healthy democracy to have a high turnover 
in councils, as it makes it possible for more citizens to participate in local politics and 
it increases the likelihood of  the council being representative of  its population (Aars 
& Offerdal 1998). Conversely, a high turnover rate may pose a problem. Most local au-
thorities have a relatively small local administration; and the council plays an important 
role in the process of  task implementation alongside the municipal manager. Therefore, 
a high level of  turnover in the council, combined with a high level of  turnover among 
municipal administrators (Hlynsdóttir 2016c) and a small administration, poses a threat 
to the overall performance of  the local level of  government. 
Based on the findings, one solution is to amalgamate, as local councillors in larger 
municipalities seem to be more satisfied with their work conditions. However, care must 
be taken when drawing such conclusions. A Danish study on councillors’ working con-
ditions showed (Dahlgaard et al. 2009) that the councillors’ workload actually increased 
after the last wave of  amalgamation in Denmark. Furthermore, the Danish system has 
one of  the largest local authorities in Europe, as well as the largest number of  tasks. In 
that system, there are reports of  extreme workloads on local council members. 
Accordingly, any major changes to the structure of  Icelandic local authorities in 
regard to population size are likely to have great effects on local councillors and their 
workloads. Thus, having larger local authorities will mean larger workloads. It will also 
mean more demands for remuneration on the councillors’ behalf. This trend is already 
visible in the largest municipalities. This would signify a change from the tradition of  
viewing councillors as laymen to regarding them as professionals. The question remains: 
how will that affect local democracy? 
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Notes
1 In regard to the city of  Reykjavík, the decions of  increasing the number of  city council members 
was postponed. The city council has now decided to increase the number of  city council members 
before the next local election in 2018.
2 Municipalities were divided into seven population groups <200 (1),  200-499 (2), 500-999 (3), 1000-
1999 (4), 2000-4999 (5), 5000-9999 (6), 10000> (7).
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